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PROCREATION THROUGH ART: WHY THE ADOPTION
PROCESS SHOULD NOT APPLY
MELANIE B. JACOBS*
The Supreme Court has long recognized a "private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter."' For me, in evaluating whether assisted
reproductive technology (ART) should be governed by adoption principles,
the question is whether assisted reproduction should be viewed as an
extension of family and procreative privacy or whether assisted
reproduction bears greater similarity to adoption and should be subjected to
a more extensive and invasive legal process. More specifically, should an
intended parent of a child bom through use of sperm or egg donation be
obligated to adopt the child? Must parties adopt a child whose birth they
intended through use of a surrogate? My short answer is "no." Assisted
reproduction falls closer to the procreation end of the spectrum than the
adoption end-parties intentionally use this technology to have a child of
their own. As such, ART should fall within the constitutional purview of
protected family privacy and should not be subjected to the greater
regulation and screening of adoption law.
Rather than having to use the adoptive process, parties should instead
be able to rely on the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) 2 or relevant state
parentage laws to establish their parentage at the child's birth. Waiting six
or more months to adopt a child who was born through the emotional and
financial efforts of intended parents seems counterintuitive. The UPA does
not in all instances provide complete privacy for families and may require
some investigative and legal process, similar to adoption. 3  Overall,
however, the UPA assures greater privacy and less state intrusion than the
adoption process. Moreover, by including concepts of intentional
parenthood within its provisions, the UPA more realistically establishes
parentage for persons using assisted reproduction: the UPA establishes
Copyright © 2006, Melanie B. Jacobs.
Associate Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. My
appreciation to the members of the Capital University Law Review for inviting me to
participate in this stimulating symposium.
1 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 1-58, 166 (1944).
2 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 299 (2001).
3 See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text (describing the process courts use to
validate a gestational agreement under the UPA).
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them as the legal parents of their intended child, not the adoptive parents of
someone else's child.4
I see this symposium as an opportunity to discuss our preferred or ideal
mode of legal decisionmaking for assisted reproduction, so I will now
briefly make an argument for application of the UPA and similar parentage
laws, rather than the adoption process. I do not disagree with Professor
Carbone's contention that the adoption process has merit for same-sex
couples and that it can provide a certain measure of security for those
families.5 But the adoption process does not accurately reflect that couples
use ART to have their own children. For instance, a lesbian couple who
purposefully plans to have a child and to use a sperm donor for
insemination of one party should not need adoption to legalize the
parentage of the non-birth mother. Or, if a married couple uses both sperm
and egg donors and a gestational surrogate to have a child, adoption is not
the best process by which to validate the couple's parentage. Unlike the
typical adoption scenario, there is not an existing child whose parents have
had their parental rights terminated and for whom new parents are sought.
The sperm and egg come together because of the intent of this particular
couple to create their own child.
When parties employ assisted reproduction to have their own children,
I find it hard to argue that the adoption process should apply, regardless of
whether the parents are an opposite-sex or a same-sex couple. In previous
writings, I have urged courts to apply the UPA to same-sex parents by
focusing on their intentional and functional parenthood.6 Here, I suggest
that because assisted reproduction falls within the ambit of family and
procreative privacy, parentage principles that determine parentage from
birth-like the UPA-best recognize and protect nontraditional families
who must use ART (rather than traditional coitus) to have their own
children.7
4 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(a)(3) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 56 (Supp. 2006)
(providing that "the intended parents" become the parents of a child born through
gestational surrogacy).
5 Videotape: Wells Conference on Adoption Law, held by the Capital University Law
Review (Apr. 7, 2006) (on file with the Capital University Law Review).
6 See generally Melanie B. Jacobs, Applying Intent-Based Parentage Principles to
Nonlegal Lesbian Coparents, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 433 (2004).
7 1 have previously argued that using the UPA to establish parentage for lesbian
coparents is preferable to second-parent adoption. See Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One
Mommy and One Legal Stranger: Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian
Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REv. 341, 352-54 (2002) (listing several reasons why adjudication
(continued)
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Assisted reproduction is an extension of procreative privacy, 8 and
couples who use ART should not be required to adopt the resulting child.
Family privacy has been a lynchpin of American jurisprudence for more
than a century. Beginning in the early 1900s, the Supreme Court made
several rulings that confirmed the "sanctity" of family life and affirmed
that states had authority to intervene in family matters only in limited
instances. 9 The concept of family privacy has been deemed to extend to
privacy in many family planning matters, such as the right to procreate, 0
use contraception," seek an abortion,12 or engage in private, consensual
sexual activity.' 3 The parameters of family privacy were at times unclear
in the Court's reasoning: How far does privacy extend? Just to married
couples?' 4 To heterosexual couples?
5
pursuant to the UPA is better for children and parents than second parent adoption). I
expand that argument here to include both lesbian and gay parents and various forms of
ART.
8 There is not perfect consensus on this issue. As Professor Richard Storrow explained,
some courts and commentators believe that assisted reproduction is constitutionally
protected procreation, although some older cases and other commentators do not agree. See
Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing Children from the Marriage Movement: The Case Against
Marital Status Discrimination in Adoption and Assisted Reproduction, 39 U.C. DAvis L.
REv. 305, 327-28 (2006).
9 See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that parents'
liberty interest includes the right "to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (holding that parents' liberty
interest includes the right to bring up children and "to control the education of their own").
10 See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding
Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act unconstitutional because "procreation [is]
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race").
1 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972) (holding that Massachusetts
statute permitting married couples to obtain contraceptives but prohibiting individuals from
obtaining contraceptives violated the Equal Protection Clause); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (finding Connecticut's statute that prohibited the use of
contraceptives unconstitutionally infringed upon the marital right to privacy).
12 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (concluding that "the right of personal
privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified").
13 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (finding a Texas statute that
prohibited same-sex sexual activity intruded upon the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause).
14 The Griswold Court considered the sanctity of the marital bedroom to be of
paramount importance when striking down the law banning contraception. See Griswold,
381 U.S. at 485-86.
2006)
HeinOnline -- 35 Cap. U. L. Rev. 401 2006-2007
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
When the Court decided Lawrence v. Texas in 2003, those questions
were answered. The Court articulated that a person's liberty interest
"presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief,
expression, and certain intimate conduct."' 6 The Court concluded that two
members of the same sex are permitted to engage in intimate conduct
pursuant to that liberty interest.' 7 In analyzing the right of same-sex
individuals to engage in intimate conduct, the Court looked beyond the
specific acts proscribed by the Texas statute and noted that the Constitution
must respect personal autonomy in a wide array of decisionmaking, such as
procreation and family relationships.' 8 When citing its decision in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court wrote:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define
the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State. 9
Lawrence thus broadly defines family privacy: privacy applies to married
and unmarried couples, to heterosexual and homosexual individuals, and to
a wide range of personal decisionmaking, including decisions regarding the
creation of families. Read this way, procreative privacy should include
ART. In addition, presuming that ART falls within the constitutional
purview of procreative privacy, it should apply to opposite-sex and same-
sex couples equally. If opposite-sex couples are able to use assisted
reproduction without the need for the adoption process, so too should
same-sex couples be permitted to do so.
There are various ways in which a person becomes a legal parent,
some of which are more private than others. At one end of the spectrum,
15 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-96 (1986) (holding that there is no
fundamental privacy right to engage in homosexual sodomy).
16 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
17 Id. at 578.
"8 Id. at 574.
19 Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 851 (1992)).
[35:399
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parenthood is established by biology or marriage. 20 Giving birth to a child
has long determined parentage, 2 1 and historically a woman's husband has
been presumed to be the child's legal father.22 At the opposite end of the
spectrum, adoption creates a legal relationship between a child and her
adoptive parents where no relationship would otherwise exist. It is a
public process: prospective adoptive parents are thoroughly screened and
evaluated prior to adoption. Parties who intentionally cause the birth of a
child should not be obligated to adopt their "own" child.
Courts are split regarding the applicability of adoption statutes to
surrogacy. In one of the first surrogacy cases-the incredibly well-
publicized Baby M case-the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to
enforce a surrogacy agreement and determined that such agreements
violated New Jersey adoption laws 23 and public policy. 24  The Court
decided Baby M when surrogacy arrangements were still relatively new to
courts and society; however, there remains no clear mandate legalizing
25surrogacy.
The Buzzanca case26 provided a very different view of surrogacy, and
one, I argue, that better reflected the intentions of the parties. Buzzanca
illustrated the advances of assisted reproductive technology and the legal
complications that can arise therefrom. John and Luanne Buzzanca
20 Jacobs, supra note 7, at 344.
21 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(a)(1) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 15 (Supp. 2006)
(providing that a mother-child relationship is established by a woman "having given birth to
the child").
22 See id § 204(a)(1)-(4) (providing that a man who is married to the child's mother at
the time of the child's birth, who was married to the child's mother within 300 days of the
child's birth, or who attempted to marry the mother before the child's birth is presumed to
be the child's father). The marital presumption operates such that biology is less significant
than the marital relationship, and even in the absence of a biological connection between
the husband and the child, the husband is the child's legal father.
23 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (N.J. 1988) ("The surrogacy contract conflicts
with: (1) laws prohibiting the use of money in connection with adoptions; (2) laws requiring
proof of parental unfitness or abandonment before termination of parental rights is ordered
or an adoption is granted; and (3) laws that make surrender of custody and consent to
adoption revocable in private placement adoptions.").
24 Id. at 1246-47 (holding that the surrogacy agreement erroneously permitted the
natural parents to make custody decisions in advance of the child's birth and without a
consideration of the child's best interest).
25 See Storrow, supra note 8, at 328-39.
26 In re Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
2006]
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contracted with a surrogate to have an embryo implanted that was
genetically unrelated to either of them.2" Subsequent to the fertilization,
implantation, and pregnancy, Luanne and John's marriage disintegrated.28
In his divorce complaint, John alleged that there were no children of the
marriage, but Luanne contended that the child due to be born pursuant to
29the surrogacy contract was indeed a child of the marriage. In fact, the
child, Jaycee, was born six days after the filing of John's complaint.
30
The trial court had many parties available to consider as Jaycee's
parents: Luanne, John, the egg donor, the sperm donor, the surrogate, and
the surrogate's husband.3' Regardless, the trial court held that neither John
nor Luanne was Jaycee's parent, rendering Jaycee without any legal
32parent. The trial court relied in large part on the fact that neither John nor
Luanne was genetically related to Jaycee, nor did Luanne give birth to
Jaycee.33
The appellate court vigorously rejected this "adoption-default model."
The court explained:
The legal paradigm adopted by the trial court.., is one
where all forms of artificial reproduction in which
intended parents have no biological relationship with the
child result in legal parentlessness. It means that, absent
adoption, such children will be dependents of the state.
One might describe this paradigm as the "adoption
default" model: The idea is that by not specifically
addressing some permutation of artificial reproduction, the
Legislature has, in effect, set the default switch on
adoption. The underlying theory seems to be that when
intended parents resort to artificial reproduction without
biological tie the Legislature wanted them to be screened
first through the adoption system .... The "adoption
default" model is, however, inconsistent with both
statutory law and [precedent].34
27 Id. at 282.
2 8 id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 See id. The surrogate made clear that she asserted no parental claim to Jaycee. Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 289.
[35:399
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Significantly, the Buzzanca court saw surrogacy as an extension of the
Buzzancas' right to procreate: "Parents are not screened for the procreation
of their own children; they are screened for the adoption of other people's
children." 35 Rejecting outright the adoption default model as applied to
assisted reproduction, the court concluded, "The adoption default model is
essentially an exercise in circular reasoning, because it assumes the idea
that it seeks to prove; namely, that a child who is born as the result of
artificial reproduction is somebody else's child from the beginning."
36
Rather than relying on an adoption model, the court instead looked to
California's version of the Uniform Parentage Act (California UPA) to
determine Jaycee's legal parents. 37 The California UPA provides that the
parent and child relationship may be established between mother and child
either by her giving birth or "under this part," and the relationship between
father and child may be established "under this part." 38 Previously, the
California Supreme Court determined that provisions in the California
UPA that apply to paternity should also apply to maternity; in so doing, the
court expanded the ways in which maternity could be legally established.39
In Johnson v. Calvert, a couple used the husband's sperm and wife's
egg and had the embryo implanted in a gestational surrogate.40  The
gestational surrogate sought to keep the baby, and the court was required to
decide whether the intended mother/egg donor or the birth
mother/gestational surrogate was the child's legal mother.41  Focusing
largely on the couple's intent and the California UPA, which allows for a
parentage determination based on birth, genetic relation, or other reason,
the court determined that the intended mother/egg donor was indeed the
child's legal mother.42
35 d. at 291.36 id.
37 See id. at 284.
38 Id. (referring to the UPA and CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610 (West 2004)).
31 Id. at 284-85 (citing Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781-82 (Cal. 1993)). The
UPA specifically provides, "Provisions of this [Act] relating to determination of paternity
apply to determinations of maternity." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 106 (amended 2002), 9B
U.L.A. 308 (2001).
4 0 See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778.
41 Id. at 778-79.
42 Id. at 782. Interestingly, the Johnson court also referenced the importance of
respecting procreational privacy. Taking issue with the dissent, which advocated a best
interest analysis to determine maternity, the majority wrote, "Such an approach raises the
repugnant specter of governmental interference in matters implicating our most
(continued)
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Using the reasoning of Johnson and analogizing maternity and
paternity, the Buzzanca court was able to rely on several provisions of the
California UPA to determine Jaycee's legal parents.43 First, the court
focused on paternity and on a portion of the California UPA that provides,
"If... with the consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially
with semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is treated in
law as if he were the natural father of a child thereby conceived." 44 The
court freely recognized that the consent in this case differed, because two
unknown genetic donors contributed genetic material to a gestational
surrogate.45 However, the court emphasized, "[T]he two kinds of artificial
reproduction are exactly analogous in this crucial respect: Both
contemplate the procreation of a child by the consent to a medical
procedure of someone who intends to raise the child but who otherwise
does not have any biological tie."46 Thus, the court determined that John
was Jaycee's legal father.47
Second, the court concluded that Luanne was Jaycee's legal mother
because, like a man who consents to the artificial insemination of his wife,
she consented to medical procedures that resulted in a pregnancy and
eventual birth of a child.48 Her consent, coupled with her intent, allowed
the court to determine the maternal relationship "under this part.
' 'A9
Pursuant to the reasoning in Johnson, the court was particularly persuaded
by Luanne's intent to parent.
50
Not all cases are as complex as Buzzanca. But the case is particularly
useful to illustrate the ways in which the UPA can be employed to
establish legal parentage of a child from birth and avoid a more
cumbersome adoption process. The UPA is not without any state
intervention and oversight, especially concerning surrogacy. 51 But unlike
fundamental notions of privacy .... " Id. at 782 n.10. Instead, the court advocated
respecting the agreement of the parties to stabilize the litigation process. Id.
43 In re Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 284-86.
44 Id. at 285 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2004)).
41 Id. at 289.
41 Id. at 286.
47 Id. at 293.
48 Id. at 288.
49 id.
50 See id. In Johnson, the court used intent as a "tie-breaker" in determining which
woman was the child's legal mother. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993).
51 See generally UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 803 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 58 (Supp.
2006) (court approval required to validate surrogacy agreement).
[35:399
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the adoption process, the UPA at least provides a mechanism whereby
parentage can be established for a child at birth, rather than months
thereafter.52
Several UPA provisions relevant to assisted reproduction are
minimally intrusive and provide certainty for intended parents. The UPA
provides that "[a] donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of
assisted reproduction. 53 As the comment to the section explains, "[T]his
section clarifies that a donor (whether of sperm or egg) is not a parent of
the resulting child. The donor can neither sue to establish parental rights,
nor be sued and required to support the resulting child. 54 Furthermore, the
UPA clarifies that if a man consents to his wife's use of assisted
reproduction, whether his sperm is used or the sperm of another man, he is
the legal father of the resulting child.5 5 These provisions lend certainty to
the assisted reproduction process by ensuring that donors will not seek
parental rights and interfere with the intended parents' legal status.
Moreover, by specifically articulating that donors have no parental status,
the UPA clarifies that it is the intended parents who have legal parental
rights.
The UPA does include greater state oversight and less privacy in the
context of gestational surrogacy agreements. Article Eight of the UPA
contains several provisions governing the surrogacy process. First, the
UPA specifically authorizes gestational agreements and establishes that the
intended parents of the child are the legal parents and the donors and
gestational mother relinquish all rights and duties of parenthood.56 Second,
52 Id. § 807 ("Upon birth of a child to a gestational mother," the intended parents should
seek a court order that they are the legal parents, and "[t]hereupon, the court shall issue
[the] order.").
53 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001).
54 id.
55 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 50 (Supp. 2006) ("A man
who provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted reproduction by a woman as provided in
Section 704 with the intent to be the parent of her child, is a parent of the resulting child.").
UPA section 704 states, "Consent by a woman, and a man who intends to be a parent of a
child born to the woman by assisted reproduction must be in a record signed by the woman
and the man." Id. § 704.
56 UPA § 801 provides, in relevant part:
(a) A prospective gestational mother, her husband if she is married, a
donor or the donors, and the intended parents may enter into a written
agreement providing that:
(continued)
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the UPA provides a procedure for validating the gestational agreement and
firmly ensuring that at birth, the intended parents are the legal parents of
the child with full parental rights and duties.5' The procedure for
validating the agreement is akin to adoption,58 and it is the most intrusive
aspect of the UPA.
To validate a gestational agreement, the court must find that the parties
have voluntarily entered into the agreement and understand its terms, that
adequate provisions have been made for all health care expenses related to
the agreement and potential termination of the gestational agreement, and,
most significantly, that "unless waived by the court, the [relevant child-
welfare agency] has made a home study of the intended parents and the
intended parents meet the standards of suitability applicable to adoptive
parents., 59 Although the home study is an intrusive process and mirrors
the adoption process, a significant difference between the processes is that
the intended parents have the opportunity to establish their parentage
before the child's birth.60 The provision also allows for the possibility that
(1) the prospective gestational mother agrees to pregnancy by means of
assisted reproduction;
(2) the prospective gestational mother, her husband if she is married,
and the donors relinquish all rights and duties as the parents of a child
conceived through assisted reproduction; and
(3) the intended parents become the parents of the child.
(b) The man and the woman who are the intended parents must both be
parties to the gestational agreement.
id. § 801.
57
1d.
58 Id. § 803 cmt.
51 Id. § 803(b)(2). UPA section 803 provides that if the criteria enumerated above are
satisfied, then "a court may issue an order validating the gestational agreement and
declaring that the intended parents will be the parents of a child born during the term of the
of the [sic] agreement." Id. § 803(a).
Had California adopted this provision of the UPA, the Buzzanca case would have been
decided in the same way, but with less legal maneuvering. See supra notes 43-50 and
accompanying text. The intent of the parties is paramount in both analyses, but section 803
allows for a more straightforward determination of parentage. See supra note 57 and
accompanying text.
60 1 do not support the home study requirement because it intrudes too much on
procreative privacy. Just as the Johnson and Buzzanca courts rejected a best interest
analysis to determine parentage, I would advocate that the UPA eliminate the home study
(continued)
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the home study can be waived; 6' perhaps some courts will allow for the
introduction of other evidence to meet the "standards of suitability" for
adoption in lieu of the home study.
The above provisions demonstrate the ways in which the UPA seeks to
provide certainty for children and parents by the time of the child's birth.
Although the provisions suggest applicability to opposite-sex couples, the
UPA has been applied to establish parental rights for same-sex couples,
too. In August 2005, the California Supreme Court decided a trio of cases
in which it determined that the UPA applies to same-sex couples to
determine legal parentage. 62 In K.M. v. E.G., K.M. provided her ova to
E.G., and the couple had twin girls. 63 When the girls were five, K.M.
sought to establish her legal maternity, but E.G. argued that she alone was
the child's mother.64 The court disagreed and concluded that both women
were the legal mothers of the twins.65 The court held that K.M.'s genetic
relationship to the twins constituted evidence of the mother and child
relationship, as did E.G.'s giving birth to the twins.66 Unlike the Johnson
tie-breaker situation, only two people in this case sought to have their
parentage determined, and the court agreed that both K.M. and E.G. were
the twins' legal parents.67 The court also distinguished K.M.'s ova
donation from sperm and egg donation, which precludes parentage. 68 The
court found that because K.M. donated her ova so that she and her partner
provision. Even with this requirement, however, the UPA allows for parentage
determinations at birth, which to me makes it a superior process to adoption.
61 UNIF. PARENAGE ACT § 803(b)(2) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 58 (Supp. 2006).
62 See Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005); K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673
(Cal. 2005); Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690 (Cal. 2005). In Kristine H., the court did
not evaluate the legality of the lesbian couple filing a joint complaint to declare parental
rights pursuant to the UPA (which they had filed prior to the child's birth). Kristine H., 117
P.3d at 695. Rather, the court held that the birth mother was estopped from challenging the
legal maternity of the nonbiological mother, given that she had lived with the child for two
years and actively coparented. Id. at 695-96. The court also did not specifically address
the applicability of the presumption of parentage regarding holding oneself out as a parent,
as it did in Elisa B. See Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 667-69. Because of the lack of discussion in
Kristine H. regarding the UPA, I will not address this case further.63 K.M., 117 P.3d at 675.
64 id.
65 Id. at 678.
66 id.
61 Id. at 681.
61 Id. at 679.
2006]
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could raise children jointly in their home, the section denying parentage to
sperm donors did not apply, and K.M.'s maternity was established.69
The court also used the UPA to establish maternity in Elisa B. In this
case, a woman agreed to raise children with her partner, supported her
partner's use of ART, and then held the children out as her own.70 Later,
however, she argued that she was not responsible for the children.7' Both
Elisa and Emily wished to give birth, and because Elisa earned more
money than Emily, they agreed that Emily would stay at home and be the
primary caretaker of the children while Elisa would be the primary wage
earner. 72 Elisa gave birth to one child, and months later Emily gave birth
to twins.73 When the couple separated less than two years later, Elisa
promised to support Emily and the twins, but Emily was ultimately
required to apply for public aid, and the state brought a child support
proceeding against Elisa.74 Analogizing paternity to maternity, the court
looked to the UPA, which includes a presumption of paternity for a man
who receives a child into his home and openly holds the child out as his
own.75 Despite Elisa's lack of genetic connection to the children, the court
held that she was their other legal mother.76 Her intent to have and parent
the children, coupled with holding them out to family and friends as her
own, provided a legal basis to establish her maternity under the UPA.77
Moreover, as with a man who consents to artificial insemination of his
wife, Elisa could not later deny responsibility for the twins. 78 Finally, the
court disapproved of several appellate court decisions in which the courts
said that the UPA had no applicability to lesbian coparents, thus making
clear that the UPA is indeed a proper mechanism for determining
parentage for same-sex couples.79
Although the California cases address questions of parentage that were
raised several years after the birth of the children, the principles discussed
therein may apply from the child's birth. Parentage determined at birth,
69 id.
70 Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 662 (Cal. 2005).
71 Id. at 663-64.
72 Id. at 663.
73 Id.
74 Id.
71 Id. at 666-68.
76 Id. at 668.
77 Id. at 668-70.
78 Id. at 670.
'9 Id. at 670-72.
[35:399
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rather than adoption, better represents the principles of family and
procreative privacy. Furthermore, the principles of intentional parenthood
fall within the purview of procreative privacy and should be given
deference accordingly. Even though it may be impossible to exclude the
state entirely from the parentage determination process, the UPA
streamlines the process in many instances, and even where greater state
intrusion is required, the UPA provides parental certainty from the moment
of the child's birth. Reliance on the UPA does not require parents to
subsequently prove why they should be the child's parents, as opposed to
genetic donors or a gestational surrogate.
As I noted at the outset of this piece, I hoped to make an argument why
the UPA is a preferred method of establishing parentage in cases of ART,
rather than adoption. I urge state legislatures to adopt the provisions of the
UPA, and I encourage courts to focus on intentional parenthood and use
the UPA to establish parentage at birth. Procreative privacy includes ART;
the adoption process should not apply.
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